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UTAH SUPRi::ME COURT
BRIEF

~gCKET NO. 35S :b CP

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAIJ COfPE..R CQ¥f1\.NY,
A Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH, and
UTAH POWER & LIGHT
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendants.

:No. 3582.
Certiorari Proceedings.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND ARGUMENT IN
SUPPORT THEREOF.
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Petitioner.

In the Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH COPPER COMPANY,
A Corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION OF UTAH, and
UTAH POvVER & LIGHT
COMPANY, a Corporation,
Defendants.

No. 3582.
Certiorari Pro,ceedings.

PETITION FOR REHEARING AND ARGUMENT IN
SUPPORT THEREOF.
To the Ilonorable Supreme Court of the Sta;te of Utah:
The Utah Copper Company, plaintiff above named,
respectfully petitions this Honorable Court to grant a
rehearing of the above matter upon the following
grounds, and with respect to the following matters, not
passed upon, nor determined, by the opinion and decision of this Court :
I.
This Honorable Court, in its opinion and decision
herein, misconceived and overlooked the effect of the action of the Public Utilities Commission of Utah in mak-
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ing applicable to the contract between the Utah Power
& Light Company and this petitioner, the published
schedule rates on file with the said Utilities Commission
from the effective date of the Commission's order and
until it should, in another proceeding pending before it,
determine whether or not such published schedule rates
so made applicable to petitioner's contract were fair,
just and reasonable.

II.
This Honorable Court in its opmwn and decision
herein misconceived and overlooked the questions presented by the specifications numbered 12, 41, 43 and 53
of the application of the Utah Copper Company for a rehe:uing before the Public Utilities Commission, the same
being embraced in Exhibit "N," attached to the Petition
for Certiorari herein, in that and because this Honorable
Court failed to differentiate between the reasonableness
of the increases in power rates sought by the Power
Company, as distinguished from the reasonableness of
the rates named in tho then existing schedules.

III.
The contention of petitioner in these respects was,
and is, that the Utilities Commission had no power or
jurisdiction to make applicable to petitioner's contract
any rates other than the contract rates, unless and until
it should, upon proper proceedings and upon full and
eornplete hearing, first ascertain and determine that the
schedule rates to be made applicable to the service rendered petitioner were fair, just and reasonable, and make

the finding of fact in that respect as specifically required
by Sections 4800 and 4830 of the Compiled Laws of Utah,
1917.

IV.
If petitioner's claim and contention be correct, then
it follows that any application of the published schedule
rates made by the Commission prior to the date upon
which the said schedule rates might be held to be fair,
just and reasonable, and any making of such rates retroactive from the date on which the Commission should
determine the same to be fair, just and reasonable and
applicable to petitioner's contract from the date of the
Commission's order herein, would and does amount to a
confiscation of petitioner's property, and a taking thereof without due process of law, and a denial of the equal
protection of the law, in violation of the provisions of the
14th Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.

v.

The order made by the Utilities Commission herein
should have been e·ffective only from the date when by its
order in Case No. 248, then and now pending before it, it
should determine that the said published schedule rates
were and are fair, just and reasonable and proper to be
applied to petitioner's contract for power service, but
it appears from the decision and order made by sruid
Commission in said proceeding involved in Case No. 248,
that it affirmatively found and determined that the said
published schedule rates herein were not fair, just and
reasonable, and therefore should not be made applicable
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to the service rendered this petitioner effective upon any
date whatever, and found that a reasonable rate applicable to the service rendered this petitioner was less than
that prescribed in the existing published schedules when
said order was made.

VI.
Further it appears in the record herein that all proceedings had in said Case No. 248 became, were and are
embraced within and part of the record herein, and it further appears from said record and the order made therein
and herein that the rates and schedules which said Commission found to be fair, just and reasonable were held
by said Commission, not only applicable to the service
rendered this petitioner, but also that the said rates
should be applicable by retroactive effect as of and from
noon of the 22d day of October, 1920, the date upon which
the order of said Commission herein became effective.
Your petitioner therefore claims and asserts that the
action of the Commission in making said rates applicable,
as aforesaid, as of and from noon of the said 22d day
of October, 1920, results in, and amounts to, a confiscation of petitioner's property, and a taking thereof, without due process of law, and a denial of the equal protection of the law in violation of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.

VII.
This petition is filed herein without in any way waiving petitioner's right to maintain, assert and contend in
any proper tribunal, of either original or appellate jur-
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isdiction, that the judgment, decision and order of this
Honorable Court herein is erroneous, null, void and of
no force and effect so far as the rights of this petitioner
are concerned.
Wherefore, your petitioner respectfully prays that
this Honorable Court do grant a rehearing herein, and
hear further argument upon the points and questions
hereby presented, and thereupon modify the judgment
heretofore by this Honorable Court rendered herein, and
reverse, set aside and annul said order of said Commission.
Dated this 16th day of March, A. D. 1921.
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
ARGUMENT.

The argument in support of petitioner's claim a8
presented by the questions set forth in the foregoing petition, is embodied in our original brief herein at pages
178 to 205, both inclusive. We shall not attempt to repeat
that argument at length, but earnestly urge the Court
to read and consider that argument because it would
seem from the opinion and decision of the Court herein
that the Court entirely misconceived the question of law
presented and entirely misconceived the state of facts
upon ·which the same was based.
At the time the Commission made the order herein
under review, the Power Company had certain then existing filed and published schedules. The Power Company
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had also applied to the Commission for leave to file new
schedules whereby its rates might be increased over, not
only the rates named in the special contract, but also over
the rates named in the then existing schedules. The
Court clearly was confused as to the facts in the case.
The Court's opinion says that:
''Nor is the question regarding the extent the
rates should be modified or increased, if at all, involved here. It may be, as suggested by counsel,
that the Power Company is demanding a greater
increase in rates than it is entitled to. That question, however, is still pending before the Commission and we must assume that the Commission
will not permit the Power Company to impose
upon the public by granting it the right to charge
and collect excessive rates, or rates that are higher
than will enable it to effectuate the purpose for
which it is created and to adequately serve the public. Nor can we assume that the Commission will
permit the Power Company to inflate the value of
its properties with a view of enabling its stock-·
holders to realize large profits upon their stock.
All of these matters must be determined by the
Commission, and in discharging its duties in that
regard, in view of the abnormal conditions 0xi :oting, the greatest care must, and no doubt will, be
exercised to prevent injury to the public or to the
public utility."
That was not the question presented. It was not a
question as to whether the Power Company should be
granted an increase of rates such as it sought. It was
not a question of whether the Power Company would be
permitted, through tJ;Ie instrumentality of new schedules,
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to collect excessive rates. It was a question as to the
reasonableness of the then existing schedule rates as applied to the service rendered this petitioner under the
contract interfered with. In short, the question was
whether or not the Commission could make an order directing a consumer to pay a rate which the Commission
had never found to be reasonable, fair or just, in the face
of a contention by the consumer that the existing schedule
rates were unreasonable; unjust, unfair, oppressive and
confiscatory. Stated in another way, the question was,
whether the Commission had any power to make an order
putting a consumer on a new rate schedule, without passing upon that issue presented by the consumer. Our statute specifically required that issue to be passed upon and
a finding of fact made with respect to it. Petitioner's
right to due process of law required that issue to be
passed upon and a finding of fact made with respect to it.
Yet, the Commission never passed upon that issue, and
never made any finding of fact that the then existing
schedule rates were reasonable, fair or just, as applied to
the service rendered petitioner. On the contrary, its
order and opinion affirmatively showed that it had never
determined that issue; and now, by the last order of the
Commission (of which this Court, under our statutes,
can take judicial notice), it appears that the Commission
has fomld that the rates which it first ordered the consumers to pay, were unreasonable, unfair and unjust,
because the rates which the Commission finds would be
fair and just are less than those in the then, or now, exist-
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mg schedule. Not only did the Commission deny the
Power Company the rate increase it sought, but it fixed
the schedule for petitioner's service providing rates less
than those which were in effect under the existing schedules at the time the order was made interfering with the
contract. It may be within the police power of the state
to set aside a contract and fix reasonable rates to be paid
by the contract consumer, but it is not within the police
power of the state to set aside a contract and compel the
consumer to pay, either temporarily or permanently,
either an unreasonable rate, or a rate which the Commission had never found to be reasonable, and which the
Legislature had never declared to be reasonable.
vVe respectfully submit that the Commission, under
the facts in the record herein, had no power or authority
to make its order herein effective as of any date prior
to the determination that the rates imposed were fair,
just and reasonable and that its order in Case No. 248,
made applicable herein, whereby it imposes upon petitioner the obligation to pay the rates prescribed in its
order in Case No. 248, from the 22nd day of October,
1920, was, and is, void and of no effect, but that the only
power invested in said Commission was, and is, to cause
the rates, declared by it to be fair, just and reasonable,
to be payable, for electrical energy taken by petitioner,
only from and after the effective date of said order so
made in said Case No. 248, to-wit, from and after the
22nd day of March, 1921. It is not permissible for the
Commission to make its order retroactive. The effect

9

of the Commission's order is, and will be, to require your
petitioner to pay over to the Power Company, for electrical energy received by it, between the said 22nd day of
October, 1920, and the effective date of the order of the
Commission in Case No. 248, namely, March 22, 1921,
an amount in excess of $225,000.00, and during all of this
time it had not been ascertained or determined that the
rates so made retroactive were in any respect fair, just
or reasonable.
vVe submit that the Commission's order in the respects herein referred to is unconstitutional, illegal and
void, and amounts to a taking of petitioner's property
without due process of law and denies to petitioner the
equal protection of the law in violation of the provisions
of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States.
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the opinion
and judgment of this Honorable Court should be so modified herein as to hold that no order made by the Commission should, or shall, become effective upon any date
prior to that upon which the said Commission shall determine by its decision and finding that the rates fixed by
it and to be charged for electrical energy furnished to
your petitioner by the Power Company are fair, just and
reasonable, and that the order of said Commission should
be reversed, set aside, vacated and annulled.
Respectfully submitted,
DICKSON, ELLIS, LUCAS & ADAMSON,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
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We, attorneys for the plaintiff and petitioner herein,
do hereby certify that in our opinion there is good reason
to believe that judgment in the above entitled matter is
erroneous in the respects set forth in the foregoing petition for rehearing, and that said cause ought to be reexamined.

